So one of my main complaints about implementing a cost-effective Nimble Storage array at my last job was this:
I remarked back in April about this unfortunate problem in a post about an otherwise-flawless & easy Nimble implementation:
The SSL cert situation is embarrassing and I’m glad my former boss hasn’t seen it. Namely that situation is this: you can’t replace the stock cert, which, frankly looks like something I would do while tooling around with OpenSSL in the lab.
I understand this is fixed in the new 2.x OS version but holy shit what a fail.
Well, fail-file no more, because my new Nimble array at my current job has been measured and validated by the CA Gods:
Oh yeah baby. Validated in Chrome, Firefox and IE. And it only cost me market rates for a SAN certificate from a respected CA, a few hours back ‘n forth with Nimble, and only a few IT McGuyver-style tricks to get this outcome.
Now look. I know some of my readers are probably seeing this and thinking…”But that proves nothing. A false sense of security you have.”
Maybe you’re right, but consider.
I take a sort of Broken Windows Theory approach to IT. The Broken Windows Theory, if you’re not familiar with it, states that:
Under the broken windows theory, an ordered and clean environment – one which is maintained – sends the signal that the area is monitored and that criminal behavior will not be tolerated. Conversely, a disordered environment – one which is not maintained (broken windows, graffiti, excessive litter) – sends the signal that the area is not monitored and that one can engage in criminal behavior with little risk of detection.
Now I’m not saying that adding a proper certificate to my behind-the-firewall Nimble array so that Chrome shows me Green Padlocks rather than scary warnings is akin to reducing violent crime in urban areas. But I am saying that little details, such as these, ought to be considered and fixed in your environment.
Why? Well, somehow fixing even little things like this amount to something more than just good hygiene, something more than just ‘best practice.’
Ultimately, we infrastructurists are what we build, are we not? Even little ‘security theater’ elements like the one above are a reflection on our attention to detail, a validation of our ability to not only design a resilient infrastructure on paper at the macro level, but to execute on that design to perfection at the micro level.
It shows we’re not lazy as well, that we care to repair the ‘broken windows’ in our environment.
And besides: Google (and Microsoft & Mozilla & Apple) are right to call out untrusted certificates in increasingly disruptive & work-impairing ways.